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 Accidental Privacy 
Spills 
 By James Grimmelmann 
 T
he realm of privacy law has more crimes than criminals, 
more wrongs than wrongdoers. Some invasions of priva-
cy are neither intentional nor negligent; it’s easy to rec-
ognize the harm, but hard to pin the blame. This article 
is the story of one such inevitable accident: an “accident” 
in that it needn’t have happened, but “inevitable” in that 
there’s no principled way to prevent similar misunderstand-
ings from recurring, again and again and again. 
 LAURIE GARRETT’S EMAIL 
 Laurie Garrett is a science journalist and Pulitzer-
prize winner best known for her book  The Coming Plague . 1 
In January 2003, while working as a medical and science 
writer for  Newsday , she attended the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. This annual event, 
a gathering of world leaders, major CEOs, and enough 
influential intellectuals to liven the discussion a bit, is 
roughly to international affairs what Cannes is to film-
making: a heady mix of high-level networking, celebrity-
spotting, and an official program of Important Events. In 
1994, John Perry Barlow unleashed his  Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace at the WEF; more recently, it’s 
been the target of strident anti-globalization protests. 
 Garrett was at the WEF on business, filing dispatches 
on speeches by Bill Gates and Colin Powell, 2 but she was 
also making some rather more personal observations. At 
the end of a week of “unfettered, class A hobnobbing,” 
she sat down to write about the experience to a “handful” 
of friends. She composed a chatty 2,000-word email about 
the issues on the minds of the world’s self-proclaimed 
movers and shakers. The email was basically a list of per-
petual post-millennial hot topics—terrorism and trade, 
American unilateralism versus anti-Americanism, the 
leaders (China) and laggards (the US) in global economic 
growth—bookended by some brief scene-setting and per-
sonal observations. 
 Her tone could hardly be called “intimate,” but it’s not 
exactly polished reporting, either. From the opening, “Hi, 
Guys” to the closing “Ciao, Laurie,” the email is a light, 
informal letter. She calls Vicente Fox “sexy”; mentions 
the “very cool” wireless infrastructure; and describes the 
prevailing geopolitical sentiments among major Islamic 
leaders. Scientists will recognize the email as a straight-
forward conference report to one’s close colleagues. This 
is where I went; this is who was there and what I saw; this 
is what I think of it all. 
 The WEF was held in the last week of January. In the 
next week, the email apparently circulated among a grow-
ing set of Garrett’s friends and their friends. By February 
6th, a copy of the email, by then forwarded several times, 
stripped of its original headers, and minus her last name, 
had made its way onto the “PH” mailing list run by the 
Institute for Psychohistory. And there it crossed into 
the bloodstream, because the PH list is  archived on the 
Web . 3 
 We all know what happens once something is on 
the Web. On February 11th, the Psychohistory archive 
version of the email was linked from MetaFilter, 4 a “com-
munity weblog” whose members both post interesting 
links to the front page and post wide-ranging comments 
on each others’ links. 5 MetaFilter is moderated, but with a 
light touch, and because of its strong sense of community 
and conversation, the site was and is moderately influen-
tial with other bloggers, be they politically, culturally, or 
technically inclined. 
 The initial discussion in the thread on MetaFilter 
centered on the question of the email’s authenticity. It 
wasn’t hard to determine that “Laurie” was Laurie Garrett, 
but to some MetaFilter readers, the story had all the trap-
pings of an obvious hoax. (Indeed, its initial caption was 
“Could this be true?”). After all, there wasn’t a byline or 
a citation to a verifiable news outlet. Nor, for that mat-
ter, was the language especially polished. The second 
commenter, “damn yankee,” thought it unlikely that a 
professional journalist would write “various insundry” for 
“various and sundry.” 6 On this view, the email was just the 
ramblings of a “breathless teenager” with a real journalist’s 
name attached in order to make it plausible as an actual 
account. 7 The close textual readings of the fraud-detec-
tion discussion rapidly spiraled off into a discussion of 
economic theory. 
 Meanwhile, some MeFi regulars decided to go check 
for themselves on the email’s authenticity. (MeFi tends to 
have an investigative spirit; the community had a major 
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role in exposing the  Kaycee Nicole hoax in 2001 8 and 
an astroturfing campaign by the director of Givewell in 
2008. 9 ) Adam Davis, who was listed as having forwarded 
the email to the Psychohistory list, confirmed that he had 
done so, but couldn’t vouch for the authenticity of the 
email that had arrived in his inbox. 10 
 And then, as the economics discussion meandered 
along, Garrett herself, on February 14, confirmed her 
attendance at Davos. In an email to MetaFilter user beagle 
(who had started out his inquiries trying to prove the story 
a fake), Garrett stated that she hadn’t actually read the 
email supposedly written by her. Instead: 
 I cannot imagine that any of the close personal 
friends to whom I sent a letter from Davos would 
visciously pas it on in such a manner. 
 Yes, I went to Davos. 
 No, I never wrote a note intended for public con-
sumption. 
 As I trust my friends, I must asum [sic], without 
going to these web sites, that it is a hoax. I would 
rather not learn that my friends are scoundrels who 
forward very personal mail to the entire world. 11 
 And so things sat for another three days, until Garrett 
broke her vow. She clicked on the URL beagle sent her, 
and yes, the email she saw there was genuine. Somehow, 
this “very personal mail” to her “close personal friends,” 
not meant “for public consumption,” had been forwarded 
“to the entire world.” So she sat down and wrote beagle 
another email, which beagle promptly turned around and 
posted back to the MetaFilter thread. 12 Matt Haughey, 
MetaFilter’s creator and benevolent dictator, added a 
front-page link to this exciting news. And here’s where 
things get interesting. 
 METAFILTER FIGHTS BACK 
 Laurie Garrett wasn’t happy to have her email shared 
with the world. She was even less happy that the “Internet 
addicts of the world” had wasted such extensive time and 
effort on such an “extraordinarily silly exercise.” Her mes-
sage to them ends with a peroration to “Be a citizen of the 
real world” and explicitly invokes the image of William 
Shatner telling a convention of Star Trek fans to get a 
life. 
 She didn’t get much sympathy. Perhaps bristling 
against her insult to their community (“liberal elitist 
disingenuinity,” in the words of one), various MeFi-ites 
fired back—on MetaFilter, that is—with some harsh state-
ments about dumb journalists who write emails they don’t 
intend for public consumption. Thus: 
 Laurie Garrett needs to learn that you never write 
something you don’t stand behind. And if you 
don’t stand behind it, it was probably satire. Always 
make sure they know when you’re serious and when 
you’re not. Give them hints, here and there that 
you’re toying with them. Berfore you fire off so hap-
hazardly your one in a billion encounters with the 
most wealthy and powerful people on the planet. 
 —crasspastor 13 
 Maintaining a free society requires an informed 
populace. Information is available in more places 
than ever before, including on the Internet. To be 
honest, I would worry about a democracy that did 
not encourage the dissemination of information 
using the Internet as a medium. 
 —jessamyn 14 
 Let’s spell this out for Ms Garrett in big fucking 
capital letters shall we? If your mate forwarded on a 
letter that you had failed to mark as privileged, read-
only or with a similar disclaimer, then you’ve only 
got yourself and your friend to blame. The mail we 
discussed didn’t have ‘please don’t forward on’ writ-
ten on it anywhere as far as I can see. Is your friend 
telepathic or are you making assumptions about 
your friends’ attitude towards your privacy. Or, are 
your ‘friends’ of such quality that they’d strip such a 
line out of one of your emails prior to stitching you 
up like this? 
 —dmt 15 
 But not being privy to your motivations, how are we 
to know why this was posted on the net? Perhaps 
it was posted without your permission. Perhaps 
you wanted it to be there, and “leaked” it. Ok, we 
know now that you didn’t, but don’t blame us for 
that lack of prescience, or for the fact that it made 
a fascinating read. Personally, I’m not sorry I read 
your email, but I’m sorry it was posted without 
your knowledge, and that some people said careless 
things about you. If you’re looking for somewhere 
to shove the “blame” though, you may want to start 
closer to home. 
 —walrus 16 
 The funny thing is that Garrett didn’t really disagree 
with any of these analyses. She herself gave a quick 
account of the email’s (presumed) spread and gradual 
transition from public to private and treated this spread 
as inevitable. She drew a contrast with a longhand let-
ter she wrote after attending the 1979 Carter-Brezhnev 
talks; casual forwarding would never have landed that 
letter before the eyes of thousands. But with email, she 
concluded, things were very different: 
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 This saddens me deeply, and I have learned a sorry 
lesson. I shall no longer deliver such personal mus-
ings to friends and confidantes via the Internet. 
No one can be trusted in this CLICK-FORWARD 
electronic world. 
 And that’s a fairly stunning result, isn’t it? People, 
serious and thoughtful people, will  stop using email  for 
certain matters if this is what happens when they use it. 
What is more, this sort of letter—a fact-filled but infor-
mal update on interesting international issues as seen 
from the inside—is a paradigmatic example of  what email 
is supposed to be for . And, after all, that instantaneous 
CLICK-FORWARD loop is one of the great  virtues of 
email and digital text. When Laurie Garrett’s experience 
with “this CLICK-FORWARD electronic world” leads her 
to threaten to chuck it all out the window and go back to 
longhand, it’s hard not to feel that something has been 
lost. 
 INFORMATION WANTS TO BE FREE? 
 It’s easy to recognize a classically techno-libertarian 
viewpoint in some of the responses above. On this view: 
•  It is impossible to stop the spread of information that 
has hit the Net. 
•  Further, information that people consider interesting 
 will spread rapidly. 
•  This spread is a good thing. 
 It can be hard to argue with these premises. Indeed, 
the rapid distribution of Garrett’s original letter seems 
like a perfect example of techno-libertarianism working 
perfectly. A writer with good inside access dashes off an 
essay, which spreads rapidly and comes to the attention of 
thoughtful readers who carry on an interesting discussion 
about the economic issues that the essay raises. It’s easy 
to feel perfectly comfortable siding with the MeFi-ites 
against Garrett’s slurs to their community. She may be 
upset at their flippant tone, but there’s serious and con-
structive dialogue taking place in that thread. This is what 
democracy looks like, as they say at protests. 
 That said, it’s also easy to sympathize with Garrett’s 
sense of dislocation and betrayal in seeing her “personal” 
thoughts spread across the Web. Many MeFi-ites did 
express their concern for her sake. walrus said it best: 
“Personally, I’m not sorry I read your email, but I’m sorry 
it was posted without your knowledge, and that some 
people said careless things about you.” 17 That’s about as 
close as you can get to a pure statement of the paradox: 
An essay that brought pleasure and enlightenment to 
many has become—precisely because it was of interest to 
so many—such an albatross for its author that she regrets 
having written it. 
 Which is why walrus’s next statement—If you’re look-
ing for somewhere to shove the “blame” though, you may 
want to start closer to home.”—is so disturbing. 18 Since 
wide distribution is so inevitable in the techno-libertarian 
scheme of things, authors who don’t  want wide distribu-
tion have only themselves to blame. Once they released 
that first digital copy, the next step was foreordained. 
Every email comes with an implicit “Bcc:everyone” header 
set; every Webpage is immortal. It’s easy to find stories of 
people whose ribald emails got away from them, whose 
“secret” blogs were discovered by their co-workers. 19 It’s 
all their fault, in this brave new CLICK-FORWARD elec-
tronic world. If you’re going to write something, anything 
at all, you’d better be prepared to share. 
 I suppose it’s logically possible to think that a world 
in which that iron maxim held true would be a good 
one. You would have to do what David Brin does in  The 
Transparent Society and take it several giant steps further. 
Given the complete dissolution of the category of the 
“private,” you’d say, we must adjust our expectations so 
as not to place such high value on privacy. As long as 
 everyone’s emails to their friends are similarly discoverable, 
there will be no informational inequality and no injustice. 
But when it comes to our fondness for speaking only into 
our beloved’s ears, we will need to learn to let go of such 
sentimentality and accept that MetaFilter is listening in. 
Much that is now said in private will become public; the 
rest will never be said at all. 
 In theory, one could go there. But Laurie Garrett 
doesn’t want to live in that world, and it seems unlikely 
that most of the MeFi-ites quoted above would like to live 
there either. But if we want to avoid it, we must either 
find a mechanism to prevent the free flow of information 
or find a reason to believe that not all information will 
naturally flow of its own accord. 
 SOCIAL NORMS 
 Not every email you send your lover will wind up on 
MetaFilter; disgruntled (ex-)lovers have been going pub-
lic with “personal” correspondence for centuries. Email 
and the Internet are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the sort of expectations meltdown involved in the Laurie 
Garrett incident. Your lover doesn’t forward your email, 
well, out of love, and even afterwards, there’s still a taboo 
on violating the confidences of that relationship. The 
strongest pressure on Garrett’s friends not to forward that 
email was social. She trusted them with a private email; 
someone among them violated that trust.  There’s your 
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problem, says dmt. Either you didn’t warn your friends 
about your expectations or you have an untrustworthy 
fink for a friend. 
 There’s something to this idea. We don’t ask our 
friends to submit P3P policies to us before we send them 
email. 20 No, instead we wrap everything we say or write 
in an implicit privacy policy, one grounded in the social 
norms of our friendship and our society’s notions of friend-
ship. These privacy policies can be remarkably intricate. 
For example, teenage girls tell each other secrets that 
are anything but. Similarly, when was the last time you 
appended “please don’t forward to my boss” to an email 
to your drinking buddies? Social norms aren’t going to go 
away anytime soon; we can count on them to take care of 
a lot of the subtle negotiations surrounding the exchange 
of “private” information. 
 But social norms have never solved all our prob-
lems—think of the jilted lover choosing whether to burn 
the love letters or publish them—and, more importantly, 
the Internet does change things. Garrett’s example of the 
letter that she handwrote from the Vienna Summit is 
telling: 
 Now, imagine my recipient found the letter amusing 
or insightful and photocopied my handwritten note, 
posting it to ten friends. And so on. Snail mail hell? 
Doubtful. In those seemingly ancient days we all 
respected privacy, and the time and money required 
to photocopy and post missives prompted all of us 
to pause and question whether we had a right to 
forward a personal letter without the authors per-
mission. 21 
 Her analysis of the reasons for that hesitation is wide 
of the mark, but her conclusion is so obviously right we 
often overlook it. Email and snail mail obey fundamen-
tally different laws of propagation. Email can spread like 
wildfire, but unless you get a copy of your snail-mail letter 
into a major newspaper or can afford a massive direct-mail 
spam, it stops with your friends. 
 In crudely mechanistic terms, going from paper to bits 
lowers the cost of copying and forwarding. It takes a pretty 
important letter to be worth the bother of Xeroxing, 
stamping, and mailing, but even an infinitesimally small 
benefit is worth the minimal cost of clicking on the for-
ward button and typing in a few addresses. People who 
wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email, 
and they’ll forward it to more people. More people, each 
of whom is more likely to forward the message, means a 
greater likelihood that any given email will escape from 
captivity. Or, put another way, email has a much lower 
critical mass of interest than pen-and-paper mail has. 
 Garrett attributes email’s wider circulation to the 
passing of “those seemingly ancient days we all respect-
ed privacy,” that is, to the collapse of a social norm. 
Technological determinists would emphasize instead a 
mechanical cost-benefit tradeoff in which social norms 
enter only as an afterthought. Both views are wrong 
because the social norms that have grown up around 
email are norms that usually make sense in the context 
of rapid and easily replicable textual communication. On 
the one hand, we don’t put quite as much of ourselves 
into any given email as we would put into a letter; on the 
other, we expect a certain degree of wider redistribution. 
The median email is less private and more public in its 
content than the median letter, not because our words 
care whether they travel by ink or by bits, but because we 
have evolved a set of expectations about email that are 
less private and more public than our expectations about 
traditional letters. 
 Even the most useful understandings break down 
now and again, and Garrett got caught by just such a 
breakdown. Her letter, although to her a “personal” 
note, is fairly evidently the product of a journalist. 
Thus, when the issue  du jour was whether the letter was 
a hoax, many commentators started from the assump-
tion that it was a relatively informal dispatch, rather 
than a relatively formal letter. It’s certainly not a bad 
assumption—lots of interesting modern journalism is 
highly informal 22 —and yet in this case it turned out to 
be completely wrong. 
 What happened was that as the letter got forwarded 
further and further from Garrett’s keyboard, the necessary 
cues that would have indicated a disapproval of forwarding 
were stripped away. By the time it hit the Psychohistory 
mailing list, remember, the original header informa-
tion, along with her last name, had gone missing. Under 
those circumstances, who among us would  not forward an 
interesting essay? (Purported attributions aren’t always 
reliable, either; just think of the “Kurt Vonnegut” com-
mencement speech. 23 ) More importantly, when the email 
reached people who didn’t know Laurie Garrett person-
ally, it reached people who didn’t know her expectations 
about forwarding email. When it comes to the norms of 
forwarding, these implicit headers are just as important as 
the official ones. 
 How did the letter wind up in its denuded state? Once 
again, one hardly needs to posit active malice. One of 
Garrett’s friends forwards it to his wife; the wife sends it to 
her two sisters, one of whom sends it to a co-worker who 
strips the headers and sends it to three or four friends . . . 
and bingo. We’ve reached escape velocity. The funny 
thing is that even a Laurie Garrett might well have added 
any given link to that chain. Given the close relationships 
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involved, none of these individual decisions to forward 
feels like a significant betrayal of trust. 
 Such are the social norms of email. Against these 
norms, the idea that Garrett could or should have reined 
in her friends starts to look more than a little cockeyed. 
dmt wrote, “The mail we discussed didn’t have ‘please 
don’t forward on’ written on it anywhere as far as I can 
see,” but what would  you do if Garrett’s email, disclaimer 
attached, landed in your inbox? The social norms of email 
look upon such disclaimers with thinly veiled contempt. 
People who send email from disclaimer-laden corporate 
accounts are roundly mocked; unless the email is obvi-
ously and by its very nature not meant for certain eyes (an 
invitation to a surprise party would be one example), dis-
claimers are next to useless. This one forward is fine, goes 
the thinking, and it is, but one plus one plus one equals 
many, in the exponential logic of digital communications 
media. 
 Even when social norms are mostly effective, it 
doesn’t take much to go critical. As long as the average 
number of forwards per recipient is greater than one—no 
matter by how little—the laws of probability tell us to 
expect nice happy exponential curves zipping up towards 
infinity. The Internet treats indifference as damage and 
routes around it. After all, if the Internet is all about 
empowerment, then we want the few who care about an 
issue to be active in getting the good word out. If you 
believe in affinity groups and virtual social networks and 
the creation of new communities online, then it’s a good 
thing that the complaisant many can be outvoted by the 
interested few. Otherwise, every last one of us would be 
watching “American Idol,” instead of just a sixth of us. 
 Social norms won’t magically save us. At the most, 
they tell us that Laurie Garrett misread the applicable 
social norms of email, as they applied to her friends, to her 
friends’ friends, to their friends, and so on. But that leaves 
us back where we were at the end of the last section: She 
won’t make  that mistake again, which means that she’s 
never writing one of these dispatches and committing it to 
email again, which means no interesting discussion topic 
for MetaFilter. 
 Perhaps one day we might bring her out of this self-
imposed shell. Perhaps our understanding of email will 
change. Perhaps we’ll have headers that “suggest” limited 
distribution. X-Do-Not-Forward-Unless-You-Know-The-
Author, X-Do-Not-Remove-Authors-Name, and X-Do-
Not-Forward-This-Means-You-Yes-You come to mind. Or 
perhaps we’ll have a mind-your-own-business norm and 
will delete anything not personally written expressly for 
us. These prospects are unlikely, at best. Some of them 
require us to turn our backs on the nature of email, to 
forgo the very possibilities it opens up. Others feel like 
crude attempts to turn legal or technical rules into stan-
dards of conduct. None of them seem workable, especially 
since these norms will require near-universal adherence if 
privacy is the name of the game. 
 To repeat, there  is something here. Well-understood 
norms do—and will—prevent many privacy accidents. 
But they have never been a complete solution, and the 
advent of the Internet has rendered them strikingly less 
effective. More people, more anonymity, fewer non-verbal 
cues, greater individual autonomy, and the list goes on and 
on. Today, more so than at any time in history, we can 
interact with people whose values are not our own, and 
we can do so under highly fluid and ambiguous conditions. 
Quasi-private emails leak out  all the time now, not because 
we want what is private to become public, but because it 
has become so hard to tell private from public in the con-
text of email. Social norms will not rebottle this genie. 
 TECHNICAL RESPONSES 
 This leaves us with one remaining response: that 
perhaps the Laurie Garretts of the world could  prevent 
their private emails from becoming public. Technological 
self-help is an appealing idea; it seems to square with our 
ideas about autonomy and the decentralized nature of 
the Internet. As dmt asked, “Using encryption are we Ms 
Garrett?” 24 
 Well, no. She wasn’t. No one uses encryption, 
not least because encryption wouldn’t have solved the 
problem (as dmt went on to admit). True, it would have 
stopped eavesdropping third parties from reading Garrett’s 
email, but the point of good message encryption isn’t just 
that unintended recipients can’t read your messages, but 
also that intended recipients can. The recipients would 
have had to have access to the text of her email, or there’d 
be no point in sending it at all. But as soon as they had 
access to the text of her email, the jig was up for technical 
self-help. 
 It’s technically impossible to give someone a piece of 
information without also empowering them to redistribute 
that information. If you could, it wouldn’t be informa-
tion. Encryption is fine for the digital connection, but 
the digital connection was already the secure part of the 
link. Garrett’s expectations of privacy were compromised 
between the seat and the keyboard; the same place every 
other foolproof scheme fails. 
 P3P—the much-hyped but little-used standard for 
Web sites and browsers to negotiate over privacy poli-
cies—has been an abject flop for the same reasons. 
Technology will encrypt your credit card number and send 
your passport data only to sites that promise full privacy, 
but technology will never be able to stop the unscrupulous 
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merchant at the other end of the wire from doing whatev-
er he wants. The only technologically meaningful bright 
line is the one between the author and the entire rest of 
the world; the first disclosure contains the prospect of all 
the others. No privacy policy in this or any other world is 
or can be self-enforcing. 
 True, strong privacy-protection technology might make 
it annoying or difficult to CLICK-FORWARD that email. It 
might require a more conscious effort to violate the author’s 
expectations of non-disclosure. This would be a case in 
which the privacy technology was useful for its effect on 
social norms; I think this is the idea that Garrett had in 
mind when she talked about the loss of “respect” for privacy 
that she sees as part and parcel of the exchange of email. As 
with disclaimers, it’s not unreasonable to think that a more 
nuanced set of default forward permissions—your choice of 
no forwards, one forward, forwards by author’s automated 
approval, or unlimited forwards, say—might take care of 
many of these accidental privacy leaks. 
 That said, any such scheme will face severe limits. No 
set of rules or permissions will ever be sufficiently granular 
to handle the infinite variety of human social relations. 
After all, didn’t Garrett want her email to go only to 
“people who will say nice things about it and/or quote it in 
a positive context?” 25 Go ahead,  you  try expressing “posi-
tive context” in a way enforceable by a computer.  
 Moreover, however effective such technical restric-
tions are at honoring the author’s wishes, they will be 
exactly that effective in overriding the wishes of her cor-
respondents and would-be forwarders. Technical schemes 
make this conflict explicit: “I want to forward this email 
but I can’t because the author says I can’t? Where’s 
my autonomy in this, eh? What about  my free speech 
rights?” These conflicts are insoluble; reifying the rules in 
technology makes them explicit; and where will explicit 
adversarial relationships be most destructive? In contexts 
characterized by informal interactions based on personal 
trust, of course. Keeping private emails private is just about 
the least likely place for a technical solution to work. 
 Even more damningly, a fundamental precondition 
of technological solutions is the ability to force the other 
guy or gal to play by your technological rules. Setting the 
do-not-forward bit on your email is useless unless email 
clients respect that bit. Therefore: Palladium. 26 Therefore: 
the broadcast flag. 27 Therefore: certificate authorities. 28 
Therefore: the DVD Content Control Association. 29 All 
of these institutions are or were devoted to the widespread 
enforcement of compliance. They encourage (or some-
times coerce) the adoption of their preferred technologies 
in many different ways, but the underlying idea is always 
the same: create a forum within which certain rules of 
behavior are enforced at the architectural level. 
 Enforcing Laurie Garrett’s wishes about the distribu-
tion of her thoughts on Davos, then, would have required 
the deployment of some serious technical infrastructure. 
The kicker is that this technical infrastructure needs to 
be backed up by an equally serious institutional infra-
structure. The broadcast flag won’t just find its way into 
HDTV sets; someone powerful needs to put it there, pos-
sibly under threat of legal compulsion. 30 There aren’t so 
many open mail relays any more because the people who 
run them get blackballed by the spam-hating vigilantes 
of the Net. Cracking open your TiVo will void your war-
ranty. Trusted systems are trusted for the same reason that 
money is trusted: because of the strength of the institu-
tions behind them. 
 If there is one thing that these huge and powerful 
institutions are supremely ill-adapted to do, it would 
have to be preserving the ambiguous privacy of quasi-per-
sonal emails. Privacy itself is an institutional non-starter. 
TRUSTe has suffered from massive enforcement prob-
lems; P3P doesn’t even have an enforcement policy. It’s 
hard to define offenses against information privacy, harder 
to detect them, and harder still to translate issues of “pri-
vacy” into universally applicable standards. Indeed, the 
very act of formulating a privacy policy at the technical 
level has the unfortunate side effect of standardizing a data 
format for the information supposedly to be kept private, 
making it that much easier to merge and mine personal 
information from multiple sources. 
 And that’s not the half of it. However hard techni-
cal protections on personal information may be, it’s at 
least possible to formulate the question in a meaningful 
way. Medical records, for example, are fairly well-defined 
things, with a reasonably clear trust model: Medical pro-
fessionals involved in the treatment of a patient have 
access. But email? Email is squishy and contextual. The 
“personal” part of a 2,000-word email may consist of 
two sentences. Two emails may be completely innocent 
taken individually but damning if they meet. The set of 
“approved” readers may be hideously ill-defined; when 
we fire off an email, most of us never give any thought to 
deciding whether we’d be upset if Conan O’Brien read it. 
It’s okay to forward this message, but not if it makes its 
way back to Jim or Flora before next Thursday, unless they 
already know. 
 The list goes on and on. Institutions may be able 
to step in and sort through the smoking wreckage after 
an email privacy disaster, but they will never be able to 
promulgate a comprehensive set of policies in advance 
of such disasters. Such a set of policies is precisely what 
would be required for a technical solution to the CLICK-
FORWARD problem of private emails turning public. 
Otherwise, we’ll be left with the situation that we face 
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here: a great many almost-entirely innocent people glad 
that they forwarded a letter and one almost-entirely 
innocent person very upset that her letter was so widely 
forwarded. 
 Faced with this choice, it’s not hard to see which way 
people will jump. I doubt that even Laurie Garrett would 
give up her ability to forward at will in exchange for a 
complex and confusing anti-forwarding email client that 
will  perhaps keep her musings on Davos from becoming 
public. 
 We’re back at one of the great truisms of computer 
security: People make secure systems insecure. Not out of 
malice, or even out of laziness. People make secure systems 
insecure because insecure systems do what people want 
and secure systems don’t. In this case, an insecure email 
system that does what “people” want does something 
Garrett doesn’t want. 
 DEMOCRATIC VALUES 
 There’s something more at stake here than just email 
forwards and hurt feelings. Laurie Garrett didn’t just write 
some random email about her cats and her day at work. 
She wrote a long and reasonably detailed inside account 
of one of the most Zeitgeisty events on the planet. You 
may or may not think that the World Economic Forum 
invitees are quite as important as they think they are, but 
they’re hardly insignificant players on the world stage. You 
may or may not think that Garrett’s account was useful 
and thoughtful, but you have to admit that it’s sparked 
some decent discussion. To quote jessamyn again: 
 To be honest, I would worry about a democracy that 
did not encourage the dissemination of information 
using the Internet as a medium. 
 Now this is a real problem. Laurie Garrett’s compos-
ing a 2,000-word email to her friends is the sort of thing 
democracies like to encourage. It represents journalism, 
analysis, deliberative discourse, and the like. MetaFilter’s 
discussion, as fueled by the Internet distribution of her 
writing, is also the sort of thing democracies like to 
encourage. It embodies citizen involvement, intermedi-
ate institutions, deliberative discourse, and the like. But 
her democracy and their democracy seem to have some 
trouble playing nicely with each other. 
 It’s possible to read this whole brouhaha as a culture 
clash. On the one hand, you have Laurie Garrett and 
her circle of close friends, who apparently exchange long 
and factual letters by email and discuss the prevailing 
mood among world leaders. On the other hand, you have 
MetaFilter, in which bloggers and netizens from around 
the world offer rapid-fire commentary and snide remarks 
in response to a steady procession of links. Both seem an 
awful lot like communities involved in worthwhile civic 
engagement. But when you look at how they address each 
other, it’s obvious that neither regards the other as a seri-
ous participant in the democratic exercise. 
 Thus, Garrett writes: 
 Do you imagine for a moment that the participants 
in the WEF—whether they be the CEOs of Amoco 
an IBM of the leaders of Amnesty International and 
OXFAM—waste their time with Internet chat rooms 
and discussions such as this? Do you actually believe, 
as you type your random thoughts in such Internet 
settings, that you are participating in Civilization? In 
Democracy? In changing your world? 
 Whereas rcade replies: 
 The world doesn’t need to wait around for profes-
sional journalists to carefully predigest the news 
for us any more. We’re capable of collecting and 
analyzing information from a thousand different 
sources and directions, even an injudicious e-mail 
by a chatty Pulitzer Prize winner to at least one 
loose-lipped friend. 31 
 The naturally sensible, empathetic reply to these 
feuding flamers and their dueling versions of democratic 
discussion is, “Do we have to choose?” Unfortunately, this 
a question whose answer increasingly may be “yes.” What 
happened here was that Garrett’s group, with its version 
of discourse and its rules about forwarding, ran up against 
the MetaFilter gang, with its own very different notions 
of discourse and very different ethic of forwarding. Who 
brought them together? The Internet, better known as the 
very same communications tool both of them were using 
to engage in their local forms of democratic activity. 
 Remember how everyone keeps saying that distance 
is irrelevant on the Internet? This is what happens 
when distance disappears. You wind up right next to the 
damnedest people. You can hear your noisy neighbors; 
they can’t help but overhear you. These communities are 
having some serious boundary issues. When you speak 
in one, it’s no longer so clear which community you’re 
addressing. Theorists of democracy are all over the map 
on the nature of interest groups and whether intra-group 
conversations are good or bad. But Laurie Garrett’s experi-
ence is especially striking, because it suggests  both that the 
Internet encourages the formation of virtual communities 
with divergent norms and interests  and that it brings these 
groups into contact—and conflict. 
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 Remember how everyone keeps saying that the 
Internet blurs the line between private and public? Well, 
here you go. Case study. A letter meant to be “private” is 
interpreted as “public”; it then becomes public because 
people think of it as such. When the author complains, 
her status as a journalist becomes a reason for claiming 
that she should expect her “personal” writings to be held 
to the same standards as her “public” ones (quote from 
dmt): 
 Your humiliation is right and deserved. Stand by 
what you’ve written or don’t write it—as writer 
you should know better than to commit falsehoods 
(i.e. factual inaccuracies) to paper, regardless of 
their recipient. 32 
 At the same time, note that Garrett’s original email 
was a “private” letter about the World Economic Forum, a 
“private” organization of “public” figures. Her attendance 
was part of the WEF’s carefully calculated media strategy. 
Her email spread so widely, in part, because it reflected 
information that the WEF was willing, presumably eager, 
to have distributed. Her email was able to cross into the 
Web bloodstream precisely because it was never wholly 
“private” or “public” to begin with. Put another way, social 
norms fell down on the job here because it was highly 
ambiguous which set of norms ought to govern. 
 It’s a commonplace belief that the Internet gives 
every author an unlimited audience. Perhaps not every 
author wants an unlimited audience. There are some 
things that Laurie Garrett would rather not write than let 
the Internet read. Actually, that’s not strictly true. Laurie 
Garrett may still write letters of this sort, but she won’t 
commit them to email. As we’ve already noted, when 
Garrett refuses to use email for a letter perfectly suited to 
email, something has been lost. 
 A CLICK-FORWARD WORLD 
 But that’s not strictly true, either. The situation is 
even worse than Garrett realizes, or will be soon. She 
would like to go back to 1979 longhand, but she can’t. She 
can only go back to 2003 longhand, which is a very dif-
ferent animal. Anyone with enough time could transcribe 
her letter and fire off hundreds of copies by email. Or they 
could just shove it in a fax machine. Or they could scan 
it and post the images on the Web. Or they could wait a 
few years and run some impending generation of OCR 
software on the letter. Same result. 
 As these digitizations become easier, the same CLICK-
FORWARD social regime that governs email will make 
ever-greater inroads into the paper world. How long until 
we see a tablet PC with a built-in full-page scanner? Five 
years? Less? Who then will object to scanning a letter? 
SCAN-FORWARD is coming; when it arrives, where 
then will the Laurie Garretts of the world turn? The prob-
lem isn’t just that the Internet is leaky; the Internet makes 
everything leaky. 
 In the face of this prediction, Garrett’s choice becomes 
much starker. She can write for the world or not at all. 
There is no middle ground. Perhaps she will write for 
the world—spell-check every how-are-you and organize 
her holiday greetings as inverted pyramids. Perhaps she’ll 
write as she’s always written, knowing full well that the 
world will make fun of her grammar. Or perhaps she’ll 
decide that the game isn’t worth the candle and keep her 
thoughts to herself. I can see her, or people in her shoes, 
trying all of these options. Any which way, someone 
loses. 
 When Laurie Garrett modifies her style to be 
MetaFilter-friendly, her intended readers lose, because 
these unwanted interlopers have come between her and 
the words that she would have chosen for her true audi-
ence. When she shrugs and lets her personal thoughts 
leak to the world, she loses because the connection and 
trust involved in private communications have been burnt 
away. In both of these cases, the sphere of the “private” 
has suffered from its Internet-induced collision with the 
“public.” 
 But when Laurie Garrett stops writing entirely, we 
all lose, because it is the “public” realm that has suffered 
from the collision. Something interesting and useful has 
gone unsaid. Not something useful to us individually. 
Something useful to us as a society, grist for the demo-
cratic mill. In jessamyn’s words: 
 Maintaining a free society requires an informed 
populace. 33 
 It’s easy to claim that the “problem” is an author who 
doesn’t believe in democracy or a community that doesn’t 
value privacy. But neither of these claims is quite the case 
here. There’s something deeper and more troubling at 
work. The populace, by the very act of informing itself, 
has cut off a source of its information. 
 I don’t know about you, but I’m worried. 
 POSTSCRIPT: ELEPHANTS 
AND LIONS 
 It’s time to come clean. There’s an elephant in this 
room. I’ve been avoiding mentioning it because once you 
point out the elephant in the corner, nobody can talk 
about anything else. I want this discussion to  end with the 
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elephant, not begin with it. But since we’re coming to the 
end, the time has come to deal with the elephant that is 
copyright. 
 Laurie Garrett, after all, has a copyright in her writ-
ten works. One can argue about the terms on which she 
licensed her email—she did, after all, send it, without 
disclaimer, to an undisclosed list of friends—but the 
baseline assumption would still be that she retains copy-
right to her words. Every subsequent forward was a  prima 
facie infringement on her copyright. And by the familiar 
copyright legal logic of the last few years, she should—in 
theory—be able to cease-and-desist her way into having 
that letter redacted from every Web site, deleted from 
every errant inbox. 
 To state this possibility is to refute it. From Garrett’s 
perspective, the damage is already done. None of the 
unkind comments will be retracted, no one who has read 
the letter will unread it. Cease-and-desist letters are a 
great way to lose old friends and make new enemies. An 
email is so small, so easy to encode and disguise, so close 
to a pure meme, that she doesn’t stand a chance even of 
identifying all the copies out there, let alone of enjoining 
them out of existence. Copyright law is not about to solve 
Laurie Garrett’s problems. It’s just the wrong tool for the 
job. 
 But that’s not to say that copyright isn’t relevant. This 
whole microdrama has played itself out in the elephant’s 
shadow. Laurie Garrett wants to restrict distribution of 
her words to certain people—close friends—and what’s 
so wrong with that? But you might equally well say that 
novelists want to restrict distribution of their words to 
certain people—paying customers—and what’s so wrong 
with that? Any solution you cook up to help Garrett out 
of her jam is going to help some other people out of a jam, 
too. The Recording Industry Association of America, for 
instance. Garrett is in the position of the music labels; the 
Psychohistory discussion list was her Napster. 
 Many MeFites were aware of this similarity. The 
hostility some expressed towards Garrett resembles noth-
ing quite so much as anti-RIAA rants. Even those who 
were more personally sympathetic towards her share in 
the ideological commitment to free distribution of infor-
mation. Hard cases make bad law, goes the saying; one 
author’s hardship, says MetaFilter, is no reason to abandon 
a principled stance. Information wants to be free, will be 
free, and this is good. 
 I’m not so sure. For all her lack of tact, Laurie 
Garrett is a much more sympathetic poster child than the 
Universal Music Group. She’s in the self-censorship game 
to preserve her sense of privacy, not for the money. If we 
say “no” to her, we’re saying “no” to the lovers and the 
dreamers.  
 On a technical level, privacy and copyright are 
isomorphic problems. Information is to be shared with 
certain people and not with others. From this observation 
have come some interesting ideas. (For example, Jonathan 
Zittrain suggests using digital rights management to keep 
electronic medical records private. 34 ) But this overlap has 
unfortunate consequences, as well, because many people’s 
ethical intuitions cut very differently across these two 
problems. A technically consistent pair of responses to 
them may feel wildly inconsistent as a matter of right and 
wrong. If credit-card databases were trivially available on 
major BitTorrent trackers, how many people who now 
believe in file-sharing would demand a complete ban on 
BitTorrent? 
 The conventional distinction between privacy and 
copyright is that the information is used in different ways. 
Copyright violations tend to involve many individuals 
violating the rights of a few large entities; privacy viola-
tions often reverse this picture. This asymmetry makes it 
possible to enforce privacy protections. You could stop the 
NSA in its tracks by prohibiting them from maintaining 
the wrong sort of database. You could go out, find major 
commercial violators, and slap them with big fines. The 
traditional privacy violator invades privacy wholeseale; 
“copyright infringement” today often connotes something 
much more individualistic. 
 Internet-enabled, peer-to-peer privacy violators break 
down this convenient distinction. There is only one 
Laurie Garrett, but a great many people have seen a let-
ter she never meant them to see. There was no central 
chokepoint, no privacy-intrusion clearinghouse. Our legal 
system can handle (or could, if it tried harder) the big boys 
who want to be big brothers, too; it’s not so well equipped 
to stop people from hitting the “forward” button. Indeed, 
for all the reasons above, privacy spills like Garrett’s are 
much harder to conceptualize, contain, and prevent than 
copyright leaks. Ten years down the road, we could have 
a system in which music traders go to jail but personal 
emails are never safe from public eyes. 
 But enough with the doom and gloom. For now, at 
least, most private emails stay private; most expectations 
are honored. Laurie Garrett’s plight is striking because it is 
not yet the norm. We trust email, not because it promises us 
anything in trade for our trust, but because it hasn’t burned 
us. Too badly. Yet. As long as the spills and leaks are rare, 
we are likely to cross our fingers and hope for the best. 
 Stupid? Perhaps not. Think of form contracts: the 
interminable pages of small print you pretend to read, the 
shrinkwrap software licenses you click through without 
hesitation, the bank documents you sign in the belief that 
the dreaded soul-forfeiture clause will never be turned 
against  you . As Karl Llewellyn wrote: 
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 [T]he form-agreements tend either at once or over 
the years, and often by whole lines of trade, into 
a massive and terrifying jug-handled character; 
the one party lays his head into the mouth of a 
lion—either, and mostly, without reading the fine 
print, or occasionally in hope and expectation 
(not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and 
gentle lion. 35 
 The privacy lion is drawing blood. 
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